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DO ARBITRAGE-FREE PRICES COME FROM UTILITY MAXIMIZATION?
PIETRO SIORPAES‡
Abstract. In this paper we ask whether, given a stock market and an illiquid derivative,
there exists arbitrage-free prices at which an utility-maximizing agent would always want
to buy the derivative, irrespectively of his own initial endowment of derivatives and cash.
We prove that this is false for any given investor if one considers all initial endowments
with finite utility, and that it can instead be true if one restricts to the endowments in the
interior. We show however how the endowments on the boundary can give rise to very odd
phenomena; for example, an investor with such an endowment would choose not to trade
in the derivative even at prices arbitrarily close to some arbitrage price.
Keywords: utility-based pricing, arbitrage free, convex duality, incomplete markets.
1. Introduction
The problem of valuation of a non-traded contingent claim has always been of cen-
tral importance in mathematical finance. One can distinguish between two fundamentally
different notions of price: one inherent to the market, and one dependent on the specific
investor. If a security was sold at an ‘unreasonable’ price, any investor could lock in a risk-
less profit. Even worse, as long as an investor could be considered infinitesimally small
with respect to the size of the market, he could create a ‘money pump’ and make this risk-
less profit arbitrarily big. These considerations lead to the fecund concept of arbitrage-free
price, which prescribes a necessary condition for a market model to be viable.
Fruitful as it was, this notion is of little use to an investor when the mathematical
idealization of a complete market falls short of accurately describing reality. Given a non-
replicable security, the market mechanism is not sufficient to determine an interval I of
‘threshold’ prices such that any agent should buy at a price smaller than every p ∈ I, sell at
a price greater than every p ∈ I, and do nothing at any price p ∈ I. Indeed, since the buying
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or selling at any arbitrage-free price could lead both to a loss or to a gain, the attitude of
the agent towards risk must be taken into consideration to decide what he should do at any
such price. Intuitively, the interval of threshold prices should depend on the investor and
his initial wealth, and it should be contained in the interval of arbitrage-free prices.
The classical approach in mathematical finance is to assume that the preferences of
the agent are determined by the maximal expected utility u(x, q) that he can obtain by
investing in the market an initial capital x if holding an endowment consisting of q illiquid
contingent claims. Pricing rules derived from u(x, q) are called utility-based, and they
form the prevailing paradigm in the valuation of contingent claims: see for example Davis
(1995), Frittelli (2000), Foldes (2000), Hodges and Neuberger (1989), Karatzas and Kou
(1996), Kallsen (2002), Hobson (2005), Henderson and Hobson (2004), Hugonnier et al.
(2005), Kramkov and Sıˆrbu (2006).
We will consider the notion of marginal (utility-based) price at (x, q), which is defined
as a price p such that the (utility-maximizing) agent with initial endowment (x, q) if given
the opportunity to trade the contingent claim at price p would neither buy nor sell any. So
marginal prices are precisely the ‘threshold’ prices previously mentioned; moreover, they
are defined also when considering multiple contingent claims at once. The idea underlying
this valuation principle is well known in economics: see for example Hicks (1956).
This paper is concerned with the investigation of whether all arbitrage-free prices are
obtained by utility maximization. More precisely, we ask if there is a ‘bad’ subset of
arbitrage-free prices which are never marginal prices, irrespectively of the investor and
his endowment, or if all arbitrage-free prices are equally ‘realistic’. And if they are, are
they simply parameterized by the initial endowment, or does the preference structure of the
investor matter, discriminating between which arbitrage-free prices are among his marginal
prices and which arise only because of somebody else? To our knowledge these matters
have not been previously investigated.
What we find is that arbitrage-free prices always come from utility maximization;
moreover, it is enough to consider any (one) agent. Although it may sound intuitive that
there exists no arbitrage-free price at which every agent should buy (or sell), we recall that,
in many occasions, the marginal price at (x, 0) is unique and does not depend on x nor
on the utility function (see Karatzas and Kou (1996)). Thus, to recover all arbitrage-free
prices it is sometimes not enough to consider all possible risk aversions: we must also take
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non-zero random endowments. If we do so, it then turns out that we do not need to consider
many agents, nor special ones: any (one) utility would do. In other words, we show that
there do not exist arbitrage-free prices at which an utility-maximizing agent would always
want to buy (or sell) the derivative, irrespectively of his own initial endowment.
However, as we show with an example, there is a very delicate point: one can not
a priori discard initial endowments on the boundary of the domain of the utility. This
will force us to carefully reconsider the framework of Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004), on
which we rely, and to extend it by including all initial endowments with finite utility u (not
just the ones in the interior).
Another objective is to prove that marginal prices are compatible with the market mech-
anism, i.e., they never allow for an arbitrage. This is important since a negative answer
would seriously undermine the legitimacy of this useful concept of price. Karatzas and Kou
(1996) also study this problem, although in a different setting.
We also investigate a number of properties of marginal prices, with special emphasis
on the peculiarities which arise when dealing with endowments on the boundary of the
domain of u, as these points are essential to answer positively our main question. As
shown by Karatzas and Kou (1996) (and, in our framework, by Hugonnier et al. (2005)),
under appropriate assumptions, the marginal price at (x, 0) is unique; so if an agent has no
initial endowment of illiquid contingent claims, the interval I of marginal prices collapses
to a point, a particularly pleasant situation. In stark contrast to this, we prove that marginal
prices based at a point (x, q) on the boundary, if they exist, are never unique; we also
characterize their existence, and show how to compute them. Moreover, we give an explicit
example of non-uniqueness where the set of marginal prices contains an interval that has
an arbitrage price as an end-point. We then prove that this considerably quirky behavior
is a general fact; in particular, given an investor with an endowment on the boundary,
there always is an arbitrage price p such that the agent would choose not to trade in the
derivative even if this one was being sold at a price arbitrarily close to p! Thus, one is
left with a choice: either to restrict the attention to the well behaved marginal prices based
at endowments in the interior of the domain of u (in which case however arbitrage-free
prices may not come from utility maximization), or to consider also marginal prices with
awkward properties.
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The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the model we
work in, and in Section 3 we state our main theorems. Then, in Section 4 we show with an
explicit example what can go wrong, and in Section 5 we present a useful characterization
of arbitrage-free prices. Finally, in Section 6 we obtain that the maximal expected utility
u(x, q) is an upper semi-continuous function, in Section 7 we prove our first main theorem,
and in Section 8 we derive a formula for marginal utility-based prices and we prove our
second main theorem.
2. The model
We use the same model of an agent investing in a financial market as Hugonnier and Kramkov
(2004), and the same notations; however, we have to consider slightly more general ran-
dom endowments, or our main result would not hold (see Section 4). We thus present only
a very brief introduction to the model, referring to Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) for ad-
ditional details and discussions, and pointing out the few instances where we differ from
it.
We consider a model of a financial market composed of a savings account with zero
interest rate, and d stocks with price S = (S i)di=1. We assume that S is a locally-bounded1
semi-martingale on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , F, P) whose filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ]
satisfies the usual conditions. The wealth X of a (self-financing) portfolio (x, H) evolves in
time as the stochastic integral
Xt = x + (H · S )t = x +
∫ t
0 HudS u, t ∈ [0, T ],
where H is assumed to be a predictable S -integrable process. We denote by X(x) the set of
non-negative wealth processes whose initial value is equal to x ≥ 0, and by M the family
of equivalent local martingale measures; we assume that
(2.1) M , ∅.
1This assumption is not really necessary, as the results in Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999),
Kramkov and Schachermayer (2003), Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004), Delbaen and Schachermayer (1997) on
which our proofs hinge, although proved for a locally-bounded semi-martingale, are true also without the local
boundedness assumption, if one replaces equivalent local-martingale measures with separating measures through-
out. This observation is stated in Hugonnier et al. (2005, Remark 3.4).
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The utility function U is assumed to be strictly concave, strictly increasing and continu-
ously differentiable on (0,∞) and to satisfy Inada conditions:
(2.2) U ′(0+) := limx→0+ U(x) = ∞, U ′(∞) := limx→∞ U ′(x) = 0.
Differently from Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004), it will be convenient for us to consider
U as defined on the whole real line. We want its extension to be concave and upper semi-
continuous, and (2.2) implies that there is only one possible choice: we define U(x) to be
−∞ for x in (−∞, 0), and to equal U(0+) at x = 0.
In this paper we will be concerned with a family of non-traded European contingent
claims whose payoff f = ( f j)nj=1 is dominated by the final value of a non-negative wealth
process X′, that is,
(2.3) | f | :=
√∑n
j=1 | f j|2 ≤ X′T .
To rule out doubling strategies in the model, one has to impose some sort of boundedness
condition on the allowed wealth processes. In the presence of contingent claims bounded
with respect to some numraire (i.e., satisfying (2.3)), one should consider wealth processes
that are admissible under some numraire; these can be characterized as follows. A process
X in X(x) is said to be maximal if its terminal value cannot be dominated by that of any
other process in X(x). A wealth process X is called acceptable if it admits a representation
of the form X = X′ − X′′, where X′ is a non-negative wealth process and X′′ is a maximal
wealth process.
Consider an agent with an initial endowment consisting of a cash amount x and a quan-
tity q of contingent claims f . If the agent followed the strategy H his wealth process would
be X = x+H ·S and his final wealth XT +q f (throughout this paper we will use the notation
vw for the dot product of the vectors v and w). If the contingent claims f cannot be traded
and all the agent can do is to invest in the stocks and the bond, then his maximal expected
utility will be
(2.4) u(x, q) := sup
{X: X is acceptable,X0=x}
E[U(XT + q f )], (x, q) ∈ R × Rn
where we define E[U(XT + q f )] to be −∞ when E[U−(XT + q f )] = −∞, whether or
not E[U+(XT + q f )] is finite (so, unlike Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004), we define u for
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every (x, q) ∈ R × Rn). Clearly, if the wealth process does not satisfy XT + q f ≥ 0, the
corresponding expected utility will be −∞, so we set
X(x, q) := {X : X is acceptable, X0 = x and XT + q f ≥ 0}.
Notice that X(x, 0) = X(x) for all x ≥ 0. We will consider the convex cone
(2.5) ¯K := {(x, q) ∈ R × Rn : X(x, q) , ∅}.
which is closed and contains (1, 0) in its interior K (see Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004,
Lemma 6 and Lemma 1)). Being convex, ¯K is then the closure of its interior K .
We point out that, if conditions (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) hold and u(x, 0) < ∞ for some
x > 0, then the concave function u defined on Rn+1 by (2.4) never takes the value ∞ and
K ⊆ {u > −∞} ⊆ ¯K . In particularK is the interior of {u > −∞}, and −u is a proper convex
function.
Suppose now that it becomes possible to trade the contingent claims at time 0 and at
price p. Consider an agent with random endowment (x, q) who buys q′ contingent claims,
spending q′p := ∑nj=1 q′j p j. If he then invests the remaining wealth x−q′p dynamically into
the stocks and bond following the strategy H, his wealth process will be X = x−q′p+(H ·S )
and his final wealth will be XT + (q + q′) f .
Of course, we want to rule out arbitrage possibilities in the expanded market. We will
say that p is an arbitrage-free price for the European contingent claims f if any portfolio
with zero initial capital and non-negative final wealth has identically zero final wealth, and
we will denote by P the set of arbitrage-free prices; so, we set
P := {p ∈ Rn : q ∈ Rn, X ∈ X(−pq, q) imply XT = −q f }.
Consider now an agent with utility U and with corresponding maximal expected utility
u given by (2.4), and fix a point (x, q) in {u > −∞}. We will say that, p is a marginal
(utility-based) price at (x, q) for f relative to U if the agent with initial endowment (x, q)
given the opportunity to trade the contingent claims f at time zero at price p would neither
buy nor sell any. We will denote byP(x, q; U) (or simplyP(x, q)) the set of marginal prices
of f at (x, q) ∈ {u ∈ R}; i.e., we set
(2.6) P(x, q; U) := {p ∈ Rn : u(x − q′p, q + q′) ≤ u(x, q) for all q′ ∈ Rn}.
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Intuition suggested that in the previous definition we exclude a priori the points (x, q) in
{u = −∞}; our main result will show that indeed this is a good choice.
3. Statement of the main theorem
In this section we state our main results; our first objective is to answer to the following
questions:
(1) Can one span all arbitrage-free prices using marginal utility-based prices? In par-
ticular, does one need to consider the marginal utility-based prices at all points
(x, q) in {u > −∞}, or is it enough to consider the ‘nicer’ points in the interior?
Does one have to take the prices relative to all possible utilities, or to some sub-
family, or is it enough to consider any one utility function?
(2) It is true that all marginal utility-based prices are arbitrage-free?
We now need to introduce some more (standard) notation. We set
(3.1) Y(y) := {Y ≥ 0 : Y0 = y, XY is a super-martingale for all X ∈ X(1)},
and we denote with V the convex conjugate of U, i.e.,
(3.2) V(y) := supx∈R(U(x) − xy) = maxx>0(U(x) − xy), y ∈ R.
Following Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004), we will denote by w the value function of
the problem of optimal investment without the European contingent claims, and by w˜ its
dual value function; in other words
(3.3) w(x) := sup
X∈ X(x)
E[U(XT )], w˜(y) := inf
Y∈Y(y)
E[V(YT )].
Following Delbaen and Schachermayer (1997), we will say that a wealth process X
is workable if both X and −X are acceptable, and following Hugonnier et al. (2005) we
will say that a random variable g is replicable if there is an workable process X such that
XT = g. Provided that it exists, such a process X is unique. To simplify some proofs we
will also assume that
(3.4) for any non-zero q ∈ Rn the random variable q f is not replicable;
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we remark however that most of our result are clearly valid without this assumption (for
reasons explained in Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Remark 6)).
The following theorem constitutes our first main result.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that conditions (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and (3.4) hold and that
w˜(y) < ∞ for all y > 0,
where w˜ is the function defined by (3.1), (3.2), (3.3). Then the set of arbitrage-free prices
coincides with the set of all marginal utility-based prices relative to the utility function U.
In other words
(3.5) P =
⋃
(x,q)∈{u>−∞}
P(x, q; U),
where u is the function defined in (2.4).
Theorem 3.1 (which we will prove in Section 7) says in particular that marginal prices
are always arbitrage free, and to recover all arbitrage-free prices with marginal prices there
is no need to consider multiple utilities, nor any special one: any one utility function will
do!
We will see in Section 4 that, to obtain a result like the above, it is not sufficient to
consider the points (x, q) in the interiorK of {u > −∞}; this is why we are forced to extend
the framework of Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004). This leads us to study marginal prices
based at boundary points, which turn out to behave quite unexpectedly. What is perhaps
their most quirky property is described in our second main theorem, where by [p0, p) we
denote the segment from p0 to p, excluding p.
Theorem 3.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, if p0 ∈ P(x, q) for some non-zero
(x, q) on the boundary of {u > −∞}, then there exists an arbitrage price p ∈ Rn \ P such
that [p0, p) ⊆ P(x, q).
Note how Theorem 3.2 (which we will prove in Section 8) also stands in stark contrast
with the fact that the marginal price at (x, 0) is unique (under appropriate assumptions),
as shown by Hugonnier, Kramkov and Schachermayer Hugonnier et al. (2005). To the
best of our knowledge, no assumptions are known under which the marginal prices based
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at the generic point (x, q) in the interior of {u > −∞} are unique (or, equivalently, u is
differentiable).
4. An illuminating example
We will now construct explicitly an illuminating example which shows why we need
all endowments with finite utility to prove Theorem 3.1, and illustrates how a number
of intuitive statements about marginal prices fail to be true for prices based at boundary
points, clarifying in particular why Theorem 3.2 holds.
We will denote by (1, p)⊥ the set of vectors in Rn+1 orthogonal to (1, p). Given any
x ∈ R and the set ¯K defined in (2.5), if we define
(4.1) ¯K p(x) := ¯K ∩ {(x − qp, q) : q ∈ Rn},
then ¯K p(x) is the set of points (a, b) ∈ ¯K whose dot product with (1, p) equals x, i.e., the
intersection of ¯K and the set (x, 0) + (1, p)⊥. Since u = −∞ outside ¯K , for (a, b) ∈ {u ∈ R}
it follows from the definition of marginal prices (2.6) that p is a marginal price at (a, b) if
and only if (a, b) is a maximizer of u on ¯K p(a + bp).
Let us now build an example of the following counter-intuitive situation: an arbitrage-
free price p and a maximal expected utility function u that, for arbitrary x ∈ R s.t. ¯K p(x) ,
∅, when restricted to ¯K p(x) attains its maximum only at some point (x′, q′) on the boundary
of ¯K . This will give that p belongs to P(x′, q′) but not to anyP(x¯, q¯) with (x¯, q¯) inK (since
(x¯, q¯) ∈ ¯K p(x¯ + q¯p)).
Take U(x) = √x, and consider a market with the bond, no stocks and one contingent
claim whose law has density
c(s + 1) 32 1[−1,1](s)
with respect to the Lebesgue measure, where c is the normalization constant. In this case
¯K = {(a, b) ∈ R2 : |b| ≤ a}, and trivially (−1, 1) is the set of arbitrage-free prices P. Fix
p = 0 and2 x > 0, then ¯K p(x) = {x} × [−x, x] and we want to prove that the concave
function
h(q) := u(x, q) = c
∫ 1
−1
√
x + qs (s + 1) 32 ds, q ∈ [−x, x],
2The other cases are trivial: if x < 0 then ¯K p(x) = ∅, and if x = 0 then ¯K p(x) = {0}, which is a subset of the
boundary of K .
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does not attain a maximum at any point in the interior (−x, x) of [−x, x]. By differentiating
under the integral we compute the derivative of h to be
h′(q) = c
∫ 1
−1
s(s + 1) 32
2√x + qsds.
The function h is concave, so its derivative is non-increasing. It follows that since
h′(x) =
(
c
∫ 1
−1 s(s + 1)ds
)
/2
√
x = c/3
√
x
is strictly positive, h is strictly increasing on [−x, x], so its maximum is attained only at
q = x. Thus p = 0 ∈ P belongs to P(x, x) (for any x > 0) but not to any P(x¯, q¯) with (x¯, q¯)
in K , proving that it is not enough to consider endowments in the interior of {u > −∞}.
This example also illustrates how the uniqueness of marginal utility-based prices fails
on the boundary; let us show that indeed (−1, 0) ⊆ P(x, x). If −1 < r < 0 we have that
(draw a picture!)
(4.2) ¯K r(x(1 + r)) = {(a, b) ∈ ¯K : a + br = x(1 + r)} ⊆ {(a, b) ∈ ¯K : a ≤ x} .
It is clear3 that the maximum of u on the set {(a, b) ∈ ¯K : a ≤ x} is attained at (x, x). Thus
(4.2) implies that the vector (x, x) ∈ ¯K r(x(1 + r)) is a maximizer of u on ¯K r(x(1 + r)), i.e.,
r ∈ P(x, x).
In this example not only P(x, x) is not a singleton: it even contains a whole open
interval of prices with one extreme being an arbitrage price. This is an example of the
general behavior described in Theorem 3.2.
The inclusion (−1, 0] ⊆ P(x, x), valid for all x > 0, also shows that the same marginal
price can correspond to multiple initial endowments. So marginal prices cannot be thought
of as a parametrization—nor as a partition—of arbitrage-free prices, with the parameter
being the initial endowment.
Observe how this example yields a function u which is finite and continuous on ¯K .
While this is not true in general, we will see that u is always upper semi-continuous.
3Indeed u(·, q) is obviously increasing, and we have seen above that the maximum of u on {x} × [−x, x] is attained
at the point (x, x).
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5. Characterizations of Arbitrage-Free Prices
We will need the following definition and technical lemma
C(x) := {g ∈ L0
+
(P) : g ≤ XT for some X ∈ X(x)}.(5.1)
Lemma 5.1. Assume condition (2.1). Then given any X ∈ X(x, q) there exists a workable
˜X ∈ X(x, q) such that ˜XT ≥ XT .
PROOF. SinceC(x) is closed and bounded in L0(P) (see Kramkov and Schachermayer
(1999, Proposition 3.1)). Let X = X′ − X′′ be a decomposition of the acceptable process
X ∈ X(x, q) into a nonnegative wealth process X′ and a maximal process X′′, and define
B := C(x) ∩ {g ∈ L0(P) : g ≥ X′T }.
The set B is then closed and bounded in L0(P) and so, as stated and proved in the course
of the proof of lemma 4.3 in Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994), B contains a maximal
element g˜. It follows that there exists a maximal ˜X′ ∈ X(x) such that ˜X′T = g˜ ≥ X′T . Take
˜X := ˜X′ − X′′, then ˜X is workable and ˜XT ≥ XT , so ˜X ∈ X(x, q). 
We will denote by ¯L the polar of − ¯K , i.e.,
(5.2) ¯L := − ¯Ko := {v ∈ Rn+1 : vw ≥ 0 for all w ∈ ¯K}.
Clearly, ¯L is a closed convex cone; we will denote its relative interior by L. The following
facts will be used in the proof of Lemma 5.2. As shown in Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004,
Lemma 7), assumptions (2.1), (2.3) and (3.4) imply that L is the interior of ¯L, and so
L = {(y, r) ∈ Rn+1 : xy + qr > 0 for every non-zero (x, q) ∈ ¯K}(5.3)
and ¯K∩(− ¯K) = {0} (since Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 14.6.1) implies that ¯K contains no
line passing through the origin). We recall that the recession cone4 rec(C) of a set C , ∅ is
defined as the set of all y such that x+ ty ∈ C for all x ∈ C and t ≥ 0; we refer to Rockafellar
(1970, Theorem 8.4) for the following fundamental property of recession cones:
a closed convex set C, ∅ is unbounded iff there exists a non-zero x ∈ rec(C).(5.4)
4Also known as asymptotic cone.
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Lemma 5.2. Assume conditions (2.1), (2.3) and (3.4). Then the following are equivalent:
(1) p is an arbitrage-free price.
(2) (1, p) ∈ L.
(3) There exists an equivalent local martingale measure Q ∈ M that satisfies EQ[ f ] =
p and such that the maximal process X′ that appears in (2.3) is a uniformly inte-
grable martingale under Q.
(4) ¯K ∩ (1, p)⊥ = {0}.
Moreover, if x ∈ R is such that the set ¯K p(x) defined in (4.1) is non-empty, then its recession
cone is ¯K ∩ (1, p)⊥, and so another equivalent condition is
(5) The set ¯K p(x) is bounded.
The previous lemma shows that item 3, which would have been a plausible alterna-
tive definition of arbitrage-free price (and was implicitly used in Hugonnier and Kramkov
(2004)), is actually equivalent to our definition.
PROOF. Item 2 implies item 4, as it follows from (5.3). To prove the opposite im-
plication take (1, p) < L, so that (5.3) implies that there exists a non-zero (x˜, q˜) ∈ ¯K such
that x˜ + pq˜ ≤ 0. We can then find a convex combination (x′, q′) of (x˜, q˜) and (1, 0) which
satisfies x′ + pq′ = 0, and so the non-zero5 vector (x′, q′) belongs to ¯K ∩ (1, p)⊥; thus, item
4 implies item 2. That item 2 implies item 3 is part of Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004,
Lemma 8), and that item 3 implies item 1 follows simply from the definition of X(x, q).
Finally, let us prove that item 1 implies item 2. Let p be an arbitrage-free price and assume
that (x, q) ∈ ¯K and x+ pq ≤ 0, let X ∈ X(x, q), X = x+H · S and define X′ := −qp+H · S .
Then X′T +q f is the sum of the two non-negative quantities −qp− x and XT +q f . It follows
that X′ belongs to X(−qp, q), and so by no arbitrage X′T +q f = 0, which implies x+qp = 0
and XT +q f = 0. This proves that if (x, q) ∈ ¯K then x+qp ≥ 0 (so (1, p) ∈ − ¯Ko = ¯L), and
that if x+qp = 0 and X ∈ X(x, q) then XT +q f = 0. Since, we can assume that such an X is
workable (thanks to lemma 5.1), it follows that if x+qp = 0 then −X ∈ X(−x,−q), proving
that if (x, q) is in ¯K and is orthogonal to (1, p) then (x, q) belongs to ¯K ∩ (− ¯K) = {0}.
Finally, let us assume that ¯K p(x) it non-empty, and show that ¯K ∩ (1, p)⊥ is its reces-
sion cone, so that (5.4) will conclude the proof. Since ¯K p(x) is the set of points (a, b) ∈ ¯K
5If the sum of two vectors a, b ∈ ¯K equals zero then a = −b ∈ ¯K ∩ (− ¯K ) = {0}.
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whose dot product with (1, p) equals x, ¯K ∩ (1, p)⊥ is contained in the recession cone of
¯K p(x). For the opposite inclusion assume that (a, b) belongs to ¯K p(x) and (c, d) belongs to
its recession cone, then for any n, (a, b) + n(c, d) belongs to ¯K p(x), so (c, d) is orthogonal
to (1, p) and (c, d) = limn(a + nc, b + nd)/n ∈ ¯K . 
6. Upper semicontinuity of u
Given an arbitrary vector (y, r) ∈ Rn+1 , we denote by Y(y, r) the set of non-negative
super-martingales Y ∈ Y(y) such that the inequality
(6.1) E[YT (XT + q f )] ≤ xy + qr
holds true whenever (x, q) ∈ ¯K and X ∈ X(x, q). Clearly this set will be empty if (y, r) < ¯L,
and it coincides with the set defined in Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) since asking that
(6.1) holds for all (x, q) ∈ ¯K is equivalent to asking that it holds for all (x, q) ∈ K . Let
D(y, r) be the set of the positive random variables dominated by the final value of some
element of Y(y, r), i.e.,
(6.2) D(y, r) := {h ∈ L0
+
(P) : h ≤ YT for some Y ∈ Y(y, r)},
and define
(6.3) C(x, q) := {g ∈ L0
+
(P) : g ≤ XT + q f for some X ∈ X(x, q)}.
Analogously to (5.1) and following Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999) we define
(6.4) D(y) := {h ∈ L0
+
(P) : h ≤ YT for some Y ∈ Y(y)}.
Given two sequences of functions (gn)n≥1 and ( fn)n≥1, we will say that ( fn)n≥1 is a
forward convex combination of (gn)n≥1 if, for every n, fn is a (finite) convex combination
of (gk)k≥n.
Lemma 6.1. Assume that conditions (2.1) and (2.3) hold. Let gn ∈ C(xn, qn) for some
sequence (xn, qn) converging to (x, q). If a forward convex combination of (gn)n≥1 converges
almost surely to a random variable g, then g ∈ C(x, q). Analogously if a forward convex
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combination of hn ∈ D(yn, rn) is converging almost surely to h and (yn, rn) → (y, r), then
h ∈ D(y, r).
PROOF. The first statement follows applying Fatou’s lemma to the converging for-
ward convex combination of (gn)n≥1 to obtain
E[gh] ≤ xy + qr for all (y, r) ∈ ¯L and h ∈ D(y, r),(6.5)
so that g ∈ C(x, q) follows ‘from Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Proposition 1, item 1)’
(although stated only for (x, q) ∈ K , this automatically implies that it holds for any (x, q) ∈
¯K : indeed if some function g ∈ L0
+
(P) satisfies (6.5) for some (x, q) ∈ ¯K then
E[(g + 1)h] ≤ xy + qr + E[h] ≤ (x + 1)y + qr for all (y, r) ∈ ¯L and h ∈ D(y, r),
and thus, since6 (x + 1, q) ∈ K , from Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Proposition 1, item
1) we get that g + 1 ∈ C(x + 1, q), which trivially implies that g ∈ C(x, q)).
The proof of the second statement follows analogously ‘from Hugonnier and Kramkov
(2004, Proposition 1, item 2)’; while this item is stated only for (y, r) ∈ L, clearly7 it is
actually valid with the same proof for any (y, r) ∈ ¯L. 
Remark 6.2. Assume that conditions (2.1) and (2.3) hold. Then Y(y, r) , ∅ if and only if
(y, r) ∈ ¯L.
PROOF. One implication is trivial. For the vice versa, observe first that D(y, r) is not
empty if (y, r) ∈ L, as this follows from Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Lemmas 8 and
9). If (y, r) is an arbitrary point in ¯L then take (yn, rn) ∈ L such that (yn, rn) → (y, r) and
choose hn ∈ D(yn, rn) ⊆ D(supn yn). We can then apply Komlos’ lemma to find a forward
convex combination of (hn)n≥1 converging to some random variable h, and apply Lemma
6.1 to show that h ∈ D(y, r). 
The following theorem allows us to control the behavior of the maximal expected utility
function u on the boundary of its domain.
6Recall that the convex cone ¯K contains (1, 0) in its interior (see Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Lemma 1)).
7The proof of this item does not rely on any other lemma in Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004), and is short.
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Theorem 6.3. Under the assumption of Theorem 3.1 the function u : Rn+1 → [−∞,∞) is
upper semi-continuous and for all (x, q) ∈ {u > −∞} there exists a unique maximizer to
(2.4).
To prove Theorem 6.3 we will need the following fact, which was proved in the second
half8 of the proof of Kramkov and Schachermayer (2003, Lemma 1) under the assumption
that limx→∞ u(x)/x = 0, which is satisfied under our hyphotheses since9 u′(∞) = 0 (as
stated in Kramkov and Schachermayer (2003, Theorem 2)) and limx→∞ u(x)/x = u′(∞)
(by l’Hospital’s rule).
Remark 6.4. Assume that conditions (2.1),(2.2) hold, and that
w˜(y) < ∞ for all y > 0.
Let (gm)m≥1 ⊆ C(x) for some x > 0; then (U(gm)+)m≥1 is uniformly integrable.
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.3. To prove that u is upper semi-continuous let (xk, qk) be
a sequence converging to (x, q), assume without loss of generality that u(xk, qk) > −∞ and
take Xk ∈ X(xk, qk) such that u(xk, qk)− 1/k ≤ E[U(XkT + qk f )]. Define gk := XkT + qk f and
s := lim supk u(xk, qk). Passing to a subsequence without re-labelling we can assume that
u(xk, qk) converges to s, and so
(6.6) s = lim
m
(
inf
k≥m
u(xk, qk) − 1/k
)
≤ lim
m
(
inf
k≥m
E[U(gk)]
)
.
If x′0 is the initial value of the process X
′
appearing in (2.3) and x¯ is the supremum of the
bounded sequence (
xk + x
′
0 max1≤ j≤n |qkj|
)
k≥1 ,
then assumption (2.3) implies that, for every m, gm ∈ C(x¯).
We can then apply Komlos’ lemma to find a forward convex combination (g˜k)k≥1 of
(gk)k≥1 which is converging almost surely to some random variable g. Then Lemma 6.1
gives that g ∈ C(x, q), and Jensen inequality yields
(6.7) infk≥m E[U(gk)] ≤ E[U(g˜m)].
8Starting just after formula (25).
9This simply follows from the biconjugacy relationship between w and w˜, proved in Kramkov and Schachermayer
(2003, Theorem 1), and our assumption that w˜(y) < ∞ for all y > 0.
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Since (g˜m)m≥1 ⊆ C(x¯), Remark 6.4 says that the sequence (U(g˜m)+)m≥1 is uniformly inte-
grable. Thus, Fatou’s lemma and inequalities (6.6) and (6.7) imply that
(6.8) lim supk u(xk, qk) = s ≤ lim supm E[U(g˜m)] ≤ E[U(g)] ≤ u(x, q),
which says that u is upper semi-continuous. If u(x, q) > −∞ then one can take (xk, qk) =
(x, q) in the above, and so (6.8) gives that there exists a maximizer to (2.4). Uniqueness
follows from the strict concavity of U. 
7. Proof of the first main theorem
We will repeatedly need the following simple observation.
Lemma 7.1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, if (x˜, q˜) ∈ {u > −∞} and (x, q) ∈
¯K \ {0} then u(x˜, q˜) < u(x˜ + x, q˜ + q).
PROOF Theorem 6.3 yields the existence of a maximizer X(x, q) to (2.4), and Hugonnier and Kramkov
(2004, Lemma 7) provides the existence of a ˜X ∈ X(x˜, q˜) such that P( ˜XT + q˜ f > 0) > 0.
Thus the following inequality holds
(7.1) U(XT (x, q) + ˜XT + (q + q˜) f ) ≥ U(XT (x, q) + q f ),
and it is a strict inequality with strictly positive probability. The thesis follows integrating
the two sides of (7.1), since the right hand side is integrable and has integral u(x, q), and
the left hand side has integral at most u(x˜ + x, q˜ + q). 
In the next proof we will use (5.4) without further mention.
PROOF. OF THEOREM 3.1 Let p be an arbitrage-free price. Since (1, 0) ∈ K , the set
¯K p(1) is non-empty, and Lemma 5.2 gives that it is bounded. Since Hugonnier and Kramkov
(2004, Lemma 6 ) gives that ¯K p(1) is closed, the function u, which is upper semi-continuous
(Theorem 6.3), when restricted to the compact set ¯K p(1) attains its maximum at some point
(x, q), so that p ∈ P(x, q). Since u(x, q) ≥ u(1, 0) > −∞, it follows that
P ⊆
⋃
(x,q)∈{u>−∞}
P(x, q; U).
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Vice versa, assume that p is not an arbitrage-free price and that u(x˜, q˜) ∈ R, set y := x˜+q˜p ∈
R so that (x˜, q˜) ∈ ¯K p(y), and let’s prove that (x˜, q˜) is not a maximizer of u on ¯K p(y), so
that p < P(x˜, q˜). By Lemma 5.2 there exists a non-zero (x, q) in ¯K ∩ (1, p)⊥, the recession
cone of ¯K p(y). Applying Lemma 7.1 it follows that u(x˜, q˜) < u(x˜ + x, q˜ + q) and so, since
(x˜ + x, q˜ + q) belongs to ¯K p(y), (x˜, q˜) is not a maximizer of u on ¯K p(y). 
8. Consequences and related results
As we have seen in Section 4, to span all arbitrage-free prices it is not enough in general
to consider marginal prices based at points in the interior of {u > −∞}. This warrants the
study of P(x, q) in the case where (x, q) belongs to the boundary of {u > −∞}; in particular
we ask which properties that hold in the case where (x, q) belongs to the interior K of
{u > −∞} are still true when (x, q) belongs to the boundary ∂K = ∂{u > −∞}.
First of all, if (x, q) belongs to the interior of {u > −∞}, P(x, q) is never empty, it
is a singleton if and only if u is differentiable at (x, q), and can be ‘computed’ using the
sub-differential ∂u(x, q) (as mentioned in Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Remark 1)).
If (x, q) belongs to the boundary of {u > −∞}, P(x, q) can be empty and, if it is not,
it is never a singleton. Indeed the following corollary of Theorem 3.1 specifies for which
points (x, q) the set P(x, q) is empty, and allows us to ‘compute it’ in the same way as if
(x, q) belonged to the interior of {u > −∞}. This will allow us to prove Theorem 3.2, which
in turn implies that P(x, q) is never a singleton.
Corollary 8.1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, the set P(x, q; U) is non-empty if
and only if ∂u(x, q) is non-empty. If (y, r) ∈ ∂u(x, q) then y > 0, and
(8.1) P(x, q; U) =
{
r
y
: (y, r) ∈ ∂u(x, q)
}
.
PROOF. Given p ∈ Rn consider the linear function Ap : Rn → R × Rn given by
Ap(q′) := (−q′p, q′) and its adjoint A⋆p given by A⋆p (y, r) = r − yp. Now fix x ∈ R, q ∈ Rn,
and consider the proper concave function fp given by fp(q′) = u((x, q) + Ap(q′)), so that
by definition p is a marginal price at (x, q) if and only if 0 is a maximizer of fp , i.e., iff
0 ∈ ∂ fp(0)
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If (y, r) ∈ ∂u(x, q) then y > 0, since f (t) := u(t, q) is strictly increasing on [x,∞) (by
Lemma 7.1) and y ∈ ∂ f (0). We can then define p = r/y and Rockafellar (1970, Theorem
23.9) implies that
0 ∈ A⋆p (∂u(x, q)) ⊆ ∂ fp(0),
i.e., p ∈ P(x, q).
For the opposite inclusion assume p ∈ P(x, q), so that by definition (x, q) ∈ ¯K and, by
Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 5.2, (1, p) belongs toL. It follows from (5.3) that y := x+qp > 0,
and so Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Lemma 1) implies that
(x, q) + Ap(−q) = (y, 0) ∈ K ,
and now another application of Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 23.9) yields
A⋆p (∂u(x, q)) = ∂ fp(0) ∋ 0,
i.e., r − py = 0 for some (y, r) ∈ ∂u(x, q). 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2 By Corollary 8.1 there exists a (y0, r0) ∈ ∂u(x, q) such
that r0/y0 = p0. The non-empty convex closed set ∂u(x, q) is unbounded (see Rockafellar
(1970, Theorem 23.4)), so (5.4) says that its recession cone contains a non-zero element
(y, r). For t ≥ 0 define
(8.2) (yt, rt) := (y0, r0) + t(y, r) ∈ ∂u(x, q),
and notice that Corollary 8.1 implies that vt := rt/yt ∈ P(x, q). Since the function (y, r) 7→
r/y, defined for y > 0, sends injectively segments into segments (see Boyd and Vandenberghe
(2004, Section 2.3.3)) and vt → r/y =: p as t → ∞, {vt : t ≥ 0} equals the segment [p0, p).
We now only need to prove that p is not an arbitrage-free price. From (8.2) it follows that,
for every (a, b) in {u > −∞},
u(a, b) ≤ u(x, q) + (yt, rt)((a, b) − (x, q)).
Dividing times t and taking the limit as t → ∞ yields that
0 ≤ (y, r)((a, b)− (x, q)).
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Thus, for any ε > 0 choosing (a, b) := (x/2, q/2) + ε(1, 0) ∈ K ⊆ {u > −∞} we get that
(y, r)(x, q) ≤ 2εy. Sending ε to zero we obtain (y, r)(x, q) ≤ 0, and so (5.3) implies that
(y, r) does not belong to L. Lemma 5.2 now concludes the proof. 
Theorem 3.2 implies that marginal prices based at a point (x, q) on the boundary of ¯K ,
if they exist, are not unique. This raises the question of how to characterize the uniqueness
of marginal prices based at all points, which is the content of the following corollary, where
the function v is the convex conjugate of u (see Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004)).
Corollary 8.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, the following are equivalent:
(1) At any (x, q) ∈ R × Rn the set P(x, q; U) is either empty or a singleton.
(2) P(x, q; U) is a singleton at any (x, q) ∈ K , and is empty at any (x, q) < K .
(3) u is continuously differentiable on K and the norm of its gradient |∇u(x, q)| con-
verges to ∞ as (x, q) approaches the boundary of K .
(4) v is strictly convex on L.
PROOF In this proof we will use Corollary 8.1 without further mention. Theorem 3.2
shows that item 1 is equivalent to item 2. Since ∂u( ¯K) = L (see Siorpaes (2013, Theorem
10, item 3)), item 3 is equivalent to item 4 (see Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 26.3)). Finally,
item 2 is equivalent to item 3, as it follows from Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 26.1) and the
fact that ∂u is single-valued iff P is single-valued (because y 7→ v(y(1, p)) is always strictly
convex when (1, p) ∈ L = ∂u( ¯K)). 
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